>it was still a bundle of contradictions, which too often were apparent to contemporary observers
Does Grossi bring some specific examples of such contradictions? Or do you know of such examples from other sources? That would greatly help understanding.
If I recall correctly, remember I both read Grossi and wrote these posts several months ago, the kind of thing he was getting at was that the scholastics might, on one occasion, use Roman law ideas of dominium when a notion of indivisible ownership seemed to best suit conditions of marginal productivity, but then turn around in another context and apply customary law definitions of complex, multiple ownership rights when that seemed to better serve marginal productivity. That's the kind of thing that the Roman law jurists and humanists, with their spatialist assumptions of rationalism and universalism, found a theoretical abomination.
>it was still a bundle of contradictions, which too often were apparent to contemporary observers
Does Grossi bring some specific examples of such contradictions? Or do you know of such examples from other sources? That would greatly help understanding.
If I recall correctly, remember I both read Grossi and wrote these posts several months ago, the kind of thing he was getting at was that the scholastics might, on one occasion, use Roman law ideas of dominium when a notion of indivisible ownership seemed to best suit conditions of marginal productivity, but then turn around in another context and apply customary law definitions of complex, multiple ownership rights when that seemed to better serve marginal productivity. That's the kind of thing that the Roman law jurists and humanists, with their spatialist assumptions of rationalism and universalism, found a theoretical abomination.