I've just bumped into this article via John Carter, writer for Postcards from Barsoom, I'd just like to say that this passage of yours here;
'My argument will be that that spatial-to-temporal turn is neither tragedy nor pathology. In fact, if we’re to be precise, even the cycle analogy may not be quite right. Rather than cycle, a better visualization would be a horizontal spiral. Yes, there is a circulating back aspect, returning to more space or time biased society. But it’s never a return to the past. During the most recent cycles things have changed, exogenous and endogenous. So, the horizontal dimension captures this change, provided the horizontal dimension isn’t misperceived as meta improvement or progress.'
It sounds very similar to an idea is was wanting to write up with a visual aspect to explain it, simply that progress is incorrectly see due to it being 1 dimensional, when in 2d it can be seen as cyclical but if you add a third dimension you get this spiral affect.
Though I see this spiral being both up and down, and being connected as a memetic hyperstial loop, if you were to add a 4th dimension you'd get somimg akin to a forwards, backwards and horizontal movement of the spiral, but I'm not too sure as to what it may mean.
Thank you for this thought-provoking post. It prompted me to re-think my automatic rejection of the relativisation of historical collapses into changes of norms : the renaming of the "Great Invasions" into "Great Migratory Period" and the scholarly insistence on the continuity between Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages has been a polemic tool against those comparing the current high levels of immigration in Europe with the invasions at the end of the Western Roman Empire.
The set of quotes from Yoffee restates the Principle of Conservation of Peripheral Zones (literal translation from French) that states that an innovation takes place in a given zone, the centre, and propagates to proximal zones by imitation or coercion. It makes sense to use this principle for studying centralisation and the complexity of social relationships.
You state that the collapse is in the eye of the beholder. You may want to distinguish the ebb and flow of complex societies from actual collapse. Three examples of actual collapse. (1) The Mayas. One can really say that their civilisation ended in the 9th century since they never managed to regenerate before the arrival of the Spaniards. (2) Hungary was defeated by the Ottomans in 1526 and the population of the Pannonian plain underwent 150 of massive change with most existing cities destroyed, Hungarians massacred and replaced with Slavic and Jewish immigrants, marking the end of the Hungarian people and culture. The current language is an 18th century reconstruction imposed in the 19th century over reluctant population and the current Hungarian culture is almost identical to the Austro-germanic one. (3) Novgorod was a large and rich Russian city part of the Hanseatic League. It effectively stayed independent several hundred years through tens of wars. In the 15th century civil strife between the boyars, the church, and the commoners broke its strength and ended its independence. Conquered by Muscovy, its population was subsequently massacred and its culture obliterated. The collapse and destruction of Novgorod are significant for Russia because the victory of Muscovy was the victory of the despotic and Asiatic strain in Russian culture against its republican and Germanic one.
Being anglo-saxon you view the world in terms of institutions and social complexity, and conceive of collapse in terms of shifts in the cultural between spatials and temporals. This is a perfectly valid point of view for some social phenomena. However those should not be called collapses. Historical collapses without remission are numerous; and they were true tragedies for those whose society collapsed.
You may have noticed I am searching a bit for the right vocabulary, but I certainly take your main point. My thinking/hypothesis(?) is that all societies/empires/civilizations are prone to a turn from what Yoffee would characterize as more to less complexity (and then back again). It is tempting to call this a crash, but as you say this often is not the right word. Indeed, my hypothesis is that whether or not an historical turn/transition is abrupt enough to call a crash depends upon the dynamics and resources within the society at the time of the turn/transition. Obviously, I have to work out the nomenclature better than this.
I'm sure that natural disasters have often contributed to such events. I'm doubtful that they're necessary contributors. Indeed, and this is only speculation, but I'd bet that those societies which do collapse in the face of natural disasters have already been weakened along the lines of the social processes discussed in recent posts. But all that I concede, is very much in the "reckon" category. Thanks.
🗨 I read it for you all so that you don’t have to (you’re welcome).
Yes, I remember you strongly prefer original sources, and my mind helpfully serves a vivid picture of a sour frown in the general direction of secondary takes 😇
Well, it seems to me the elite of America are showing a lot of signs of something that looks like collapse. Though I do think that could be a healthy thing for America.
I've just bumped into this article via John Carter, writer for Postcards from Barsoom, I'd just like to say that this passage of yours here;
'My argument will be that that spatial-to-temporal turn is neither tragedy nor pathology. In fact, if we’re to be precise, even the cycle analogy may not be quite right. Rather than cycle, a better visualization would be a horizontal spiral. Yes, there is a circulating back aspect, returning to more space or time biased society. But it’s never a return to the past. During the most recent cycles things have changed, exogenous and endogenous. So, the horizontal dimension captures this change, provided the horizontal dimension isn’t misperceived as meta improvement or progress.'
It sounds very similar to an idea is was wanting to write up with a visual aspect to explain it, simply that progress is incorrectly see due to it being 1 dimensional, when in 2d it can be seen as cyclical but if you add a third dimension you get this spiral affect.
Though I see this spiral being both up and down, and being connected as a memetic hyperstial loop, if you were to add a 4th dimension you'd get somimg akin to a forwards, backwards and horizontal movement of the spiral, but I'm not too sure as to what it may mean.
Dear Evolved Psyché,
Thank you for this thought-provoking post. It prompted me to re-think my automatic rejection of the relativisation of historical collapses into changes of norms : the renaming of the "Great Invasions" into "Great Migratory Period" and the scholarly insistence on the continuity between Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages has been a polemic tool against those comparing the current high levels of immigration in Europe with the invasions at the end of the Western Roman Empire.
The set of quotes from Yoffee restates the Principle of Conservation of Peripheral Zones (literal translation from French) that states that an innovation takes place in a given zone, the centre, and propagates to proximal zones by imitation or coercion. It makes sense to use this principle for studying centralisation and the complexity of social relationships.
You state that the collapse is in the eye of the beholder. You may want to distinguish the ebb and flow of complex societies from actual collapse. Three examples of actual collapse. (1) The Mayas. One can really say that their civilisation ended in the 9th century since they never managed to regenerate before the arrival of the Spaniards. (2) Hungary was defeated by the Ottomans in 1526 and the population of the Pannonian plain underwent 150 of massive change with most existing cities destroyed, Hungarians massacred and replaced with Slavic and Jewish immigrants, marking the end of the Hungarian people and culture. The current language is an 18th century reconstruction imposed in the 19th century over reluctant population and the current Hungarian culture is almost identical to the Austro-germanic one. (3) Novgorod was a large and rich Russian city part of the Hanseatic League. It effectively stayed independent several hundred years through tens of wars. In the 15th century civil strife between the boyars, the church, and the commoners broke its strength and ended its independence. Conquered by Muscovy, its population was subsequently massacred and its culture obliterated. The collapse and destruction of Novgorod are significant for Russia because the victory of Muscovy was the victory of the despotic and Asiatic strain in Russian culture against its republican and Germanic one.
Being anglo-saxon you view the world in terms of institutions and social complexity, and conceive of collapse in terms of shifts in the cultural between spatials and temporals. This is a perfectly valid point of view for some social phenomena. However those should not be called collapses. Historical collapses without remission are numerous; and they were true tragedies for those whose society collapsed.
You may have noticed I am searching a bit for the right vocabulary, but I certainly take your main point. My thinking/hypothesis(?) is that all societies/empires/civilizations are prone to a turn from what Yoffee would characterize as more to less complexity (and then back again). It is tempting to call this a crash, but as you say this often is not the right word. Indeed, my hypothesis is that whether or not an historical turn/transition is abrupt enough to call a crash depends upon the dynamics and resources within the society at the time of the turn/transition. Obviously, I have to work out the nomenclature better than this.
Thanks for your comment, as always.
What do you reckon about the natural disaster theory of societal collapse, as propounded by Gunnar Heinsohn et al.? https://q-mag.org/gunnar-heinsohn-tenth-century-collapse.html
I'm sure that natural disasters have often contributed to such events. I'm doubtful that they're necessary contributors. Indeed, and this is only speculation, but I'd bet that those societies which do collapse in the face of natural disasters have already been weakened along the lines of the social processes discussed in recent posts. But all that I concede, is very much in the "reckon" category. Thanks.
Wrt footnote #1. A while back, one Theophilus Chilton did a comprehensive dissection of its introductory chapter with an eye to our times. In five parts, here’s the start --> neociceroniantimes.substack.com/p/chapter-review-after-collapse-the 👌
🗨 I read it for you all so that you don’t have to (you’re welcome).
Yes, I remember you strongly prefer original sources, and my mind helpfully serves a vivid picture of a sour frown in the general direction of secondary takes 😇
Thanks again!!
By way of street-art illustration (way off in substance... but beauty redeems I hear 😊) --> thisiscolossal.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/blu-1.jpg
That's pretty good. Thanks!
Well, it seems to me the elite of America are showing a lot of signs of something that looks like collapse. Though I do think that could be a healthy thing for America.